Amelia v Dallas
One trivial thing illustrated by the table is the aptness of the February timing of this conference. The four decisions I regard of greatest interest (Victoria v CFMEU, Lawrence, Lodhi and Petroulias) were delivered in December 2013 (which is also the shortest month of the courts' calendar). Almost half of the decisions (16 out of 33) were delivered in the last three months of 2013. I doubt that is explained by chance; 2 I suspect there is scope for a more extended analysis of the phenomenon.
Substantively, the 2013 decisions reflect three important themes. The first is perhaps underappreciated, and relates to the maturity of the Australian legal system. None of the decisions concerns a challenge to federal legislative power, 3 which was the mainstay of the constitutional law course Professor Crawford taught me 26 years ago. Instead, the overwhelming majority of the litigation concerns implied limitations on federal and state legislative power (three Melbourne Corporation cases, half a dozen Kable cases and a slew of Lange cases) or the interaction between federal and state laws and the exercise of judicial power. This may have consequences for how we think about, and teach, constitutional law. I suspect there is no one in this room more enthusiastic than me for the teaching of so-called "dead" languages at school and university. Although reading and teaching the decisions on the trade and commerce power, or the industrial relations power, is an excellent introduction to the social and economic history of 20 th century Australia, it is far removed from the practice of constitutional law as it now occurs, in a relatively mature constitutional setting in the 21 st century. If we want to explain or teach constitutional law as a living, useful and relevant subject, there is a deal to be said for shifting its focus towards the areas which continue to yield new learning and reducing the focus on areas where principles are settled and well understood. 4 It may be constructive to step back and re-evaluate what we understand "constitutional law" to mean. Coincidentally, what precisely amounts to "constitutional law" is presently the subject of lively debate in the United Kingdom, although in a very different context. 5 More particularly, the question what is "State constitutional law" continues to arise. 6 For the 1 The addendum to this paper refers to four decisions which were brought to my attention after the conference. 2 It is consistent with the output of appellate courts throughout the common law world. For example, the New South Wales Court of Appeal tends to deliver six or seven substantive decisions a week throughout March until November, and double that number in December: the monthly number of "principal judgments" (ie excluding interlocutory judgments and supplementary judgments on orders or costs) delivered in 2013, according to NSW CaseLaw, was: January 0, February 23, March 18, April 19, May 25, June 34, July 29, August 31, September 28, October 29, November 28 and December 56. This may be seen in the shrinking of material on s 51(i) to 13 pages (less than 1%), and the deletion of material on s 51(xxxv) (a head of power slain by WorkChoices), in the latest edition of G Williams, S Brennan and A Lynch, Blackshield & Williams Australian Constitutional Law & Theory (6 th ed 2014), and the expansion of chapters on executive and judicial power. purposes of this paper, I have taken the view that there are seven constitutions in this federation and that State constitutional law decisions ought to be mentioned, as well as decisions on the interaction of federal and state laws and courts. That accords with Professor Lewis' definition: "the constitutional lawyer sets about the task of charting the institutions and processes of actual public power." 7 Secondly, the most numerous cases were those based on the implied freedom of political communication. In light of Monis, it seems likely that that trend will continue. These cases illustrated two fairly obvious truths. On the one hand, it is relatively easy to establish a burdening of political communication, either indirectly, or directly and substantially -in every case, this was either conceded, or the submission that there was no burden was rejected. 8 On the other hand, given that "reasonably appropriate and adapted" is far less stringent than "essential or unavoidable", most commonly the statute has withstood challenge, and here the negative formulation in Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162 at [85] has been influential. 9 As it has been put in Blackshield and Williams, "the freedom will rarely avail the litigant who seeks to rely on it". In our view, also critical to a State's capacity to function as a government is its ability, not only to determine the number and identity of those whom it wishes to engage at the higher levels of government, but also to determine the terms and conditions on which those persons shall be engaged. Hence, Ministers, ministerial assistants and advisers, heads of department and high level statutory office holders, parliamentary officers and judges would clearly fall within this group. The implied limitation would protect States from the exercise by the Commission of power to fix minimum wages and working conditions in respect of such persons, and possibly others as well.
The challengers' primary idea was that policing was a sufficiently core and essential function of government to engage this principle, which, after all, extended to "ministerial assistants and advisers". However, to the extent it was put that policing was per se a subject matter which attracted protection, the submission was rejected because it had in substance been determined by the High Court in the AEU case itself: at [107] . The fallback argument was that some or all of the senior officers fell within the description of "high level statutory office holders", but Siopis J held that only the Commissioner of Police (who was one of the applicants) fell within the scope of the implied limitation. Insofar as the principle applied to the executive government, it only applied to the remuneration of "those persons who are directly responsible to Parliament, or directly associated with, and responsible, to those persons": at [110] .
An appeal to the Full Federal Court was filed 12 December 2013, and is to be listed in the August 2014 sittings. There was no doubt that remuneration of members of the State Legislature was protected by the reformulated Melbourne Corporation doctrine; they are legislators and potential Ministers: Clarke at [69] . But there was a critical difference in the nature of the legislation, for there was no "constitutionally protected fund". 13 The impact of the tax did not, directly, impose any obligation upon members of the Victorian Parliament who were members of the fund; it merely increased (significantly) the liabilities of the trustee. In consequence, the Victorian Parliament enacted legislation which created a "surcharge debt account" for each member which was debited each time the trustee paid that member's surcharge.
Victorian Parliamentary Trustee
Although it might be thought that the economic effect was similar, that was insufficient to contravene the implied constitutional limitation on power.
14 As the joint judgment of Kenny, Perram and Robertson JJ said at [57]:
The State of Victoria has had imposed upon it a tax of general application: unlike the legislation considered in Austin and in Clarke there is no special legislation singling out high office-holders of the State. The State of Victoria has chosen to pass that tax on to the members of the Fund. It did not have to do that. … The State of Victoria chose to respond legislatively not to head off an interference with the terms of the engagement of its members of Parliament but instead to relieve itself of an unwanted pressure on the Consolidated Fund.
On ordinary principles (the authority of the Payroll Tax case), such legislation, being a tax of general application, was not invalid.
CFMEU
The remaining Melbourne Corporation challenge was an innovative response to an innovative claim by the union that the State's assessment that Lend Lease had entered into an enterprise agreement with its employees contrary to the State's tendering guidelines amounted to the taking of adverse action contrary to Part 3-1 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) Importantly, the "Implementation Guidelines to the Victorian Code of Practice for the Building and Construction Industry" were not formulated to inform statutory discretion, and did not of themselves create legal rights or obligations. Nevertheless, the litigation proceeded on the basis that a consortium including Lend Lease might be unable to win a tender to build a regional hospital; as it turns out, shortly after the primary judge reserved judgment on liability, the consortium which included Lend Lease was awarded the tender. (The foregoing simplifies the factual background very significantly.)
The primary judge found that there had been a breach: CFMEU v Victoria [2013] FCA 445; 302 ALR 1 and imposed a penalty of $25,000 [2013] FCA 1034. By way of defence, the State advanced an argument that if the federal law had the operation for which the union claimed, it was an impairment of the State's functions contrary to Melbourne Corporation. The primary judge heard, but did not find it necessary to determine, full argument on the submission that the Victorian referral of industrial and employment subject matters on which ss 340-342 of the federal Act are based was a complete answer to the contention (at [276] ; 13 It will be recalled that separate legislation imposes superannuation surcharge tax directly upon the members of a defined benefits scheme where the trustee may not itself be taxed because of s 114 of the Constitution; the Court noted at [10] that the trustee expressly declined to argue that s 114 applied. 14 The main constitutional point arose on a cross-appeal by the union, which contended that the adoption and announcement of executive government policy contrary to federal law was "invalid and of no effect", relying on Williams v Commonwealth of Australia (2012) 248 CLR 156. It had not been necessary for the primary judge to address this argument. The union's submission was soundly rejected. [T]he cross-appeal seeks to argue for a general limitation on the power of the executive government of a State not to undermine or interfere with the operation of Federal statute law.
The first thing that may be said is that no restriction of this kind arises, in terms, from the Constitution and none is necessary for the reasons expressed by Heydon J [viz, s 109 supplied ample protection to the Commonwealth]. Secondly, we see nothing in Williams, with respect, which states such a proposition, even obliquely. If anything, the contrary is the case.
It is clear that principles in Williams cannot be undiscriminatingly translated to the executive government of the States. What remains for determination in future cases is the extent to which aspects of those principles apply, whether directly or by analogy. Buchanan and Griffiths JJ said that "we do not suggest that Williams has no implications for State executive power": at [146] . Kenny J said at [27] that Williams strongly indicated that:
… there are important synergies between the constitutional considerations that affect the contract-making power of the Commonwealth executive and that which affect the contractmaking power of the State.
Her Honour added that although some State constitutional principles might not be expressly stated in State constitutions that did not mean that they did not exist and could be safely disregarded, referring with approval to the responsibility of the executive to parliament which Allsop P regarded as "an essential attribute of the system of responsible government introduced [ [29] ). This was put as a matter of statutory construction (and the conclusion may or may not translate to different statutory contexts): the State, being a body politic, was not a "body corporate" within the meaning of this particular federal statute. The reasoning records a result which a lawyer in the United States, versed in the decisions on the 11 th amendment, would find astonishing; that is yet another example of the foreignness of that country's federal system from our own.
Finally, the nuanced approach adopted by all members of the Court to translating these principles to the State sphere may be contrasted with the pattern of decisions over the last 15 years on the implied freedom recognised in Lange, culminating in the Political Donations case last year. Those cases disclose little attention being given (principally, it must be said, by the parties) to the different constitutional underpinnings of the Commonwealth and the States.
16 I turn to those decisions next. • First, her Honour rejected a submission that the act of staying overnight did not of itself constitute political communication, and in so doing reviewed and relied upon decisions relating to non-verbal protest in many jurisdictions including Europe and North America, whilst being conscious that those decisions did not automatically translate into the Australian context.
II. Lange O'Flaherty
• Secondly, her Honour found that the operation and effect (although not the terms) of the State law meaningfully burdened the freedom, and that is sufficient.
• Thirdly, her Honour noted that there was no dispute that the freedom extended to State legislative power. Once again, the difficulties surrounding the translation of a limitation on legislative power to the largely unentrenched State constitutions were elided over, although it must be acknowledged that • Fourthly, her Honour identified the legitimate ends of the prohibition (maintaining public health, safety and amenity in a high use public area), and gave a careful analysis of why it was reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve that legitimate end, including reliance on the facts that (a) the law was not directed to political communication, (b) it was connected with conduct not words, (c) it was limited in area and time and (d) there were no obvious alternatives by which those legitimate ends could be effectuated.
An appeal was heard (by Edmonds, Tracey and Flick JJ) on 7 November 2013 and is reserved. Indeed, the choice to commence in the Federal Court involved Mr Muldoon running the gauntlet of a novel jurisdictional challenge. For it was said that there was no challenge to the validity of the statutes pursuant to which regulations were made; the question, so it was said, was whether there was a valid exercise of the statutory power to make delegated legislation. The point of the submission was to deny "arising under" jurisdiction to the Federal Court under s 39B(1A)(b) of the Judiciary Act. This was rejected, North J following and applying the reasoning in Levy, and distinguishing Wotton, which was a challenge to an administrative decision, rather than the exercise of power to make delegated legislation: at One Lange question arose from the submission by the defendants that if judicial immunity prevented an inquiry into the decisions supporting the defence of truth, then it burdened the implied freedom of political communication and was not reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end. That question did not arise, on any of the approaches of the fivemember court to whom the issues were referred. All members of the Court concluded that her Honour having commenced the action, judicial immunity could not be used as a sword to prevent a statutory defence of truth.
Muldoon
The larger question was whether the magistrate was able to maintain a cause of action in defamation at all, in circumstances where the imputations related to the conduct, competence and capacity of the performance of her functions as a judicial officer. The majority of the Court (Beazley P, McColl JA and Tobias AJA) held that judges, no differently from other members of the community, could sue in defamation at least where, as here, the decisions (save for one) had been made many years previously and it was a "virtual certainty" that contempt proceedings could not be brought. Dissenting, broadly in accordance with a passage in the reasons of McHugh J in Mann v O'Neill (1997) 191 CLR 204 at 235, Basten JA, with whom McCallum J agreed, considered that she could not. In a sense (perhaps an extenuated sense) that may be seen as an aspect of the common law of defamation conforming with the Constitution; cf Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 566 (although this was not how it was decided nor argued); it is also a decision which in the United Kingdom would be regarded as "constitutional". , which authorises preliminary discovery of documents to discover the identity of a prospective defendant. Ms Liu alleged that The Age newspaper had published imputations of corrupt conduct by her in connection with dealings with a federal Labor politician, and sought preliminary discovery of the sources from the publisher and three journalists. Part of the defence was a challenge to the validity of the rule.
Liu
Bathurst CJ (with whom Beazley and McColl JJA agreed) confirmed that in a challenge based upon the implied freedom of political communications, the starting point is to construe the rule: at [85] . Preliminary discovery was only available where there was a genuinely held and objectively based desire to commence proceedings, which could not be commenced notwithstanding the applicant having made reasonable inquiries, and which in any event remained discretionary. Bathurst CJ found it unnecessary to answer whether the implied freedom directly required that general discretion only validly to be exercised in accordance with constitutional requirements and limitations: that it was sufficient for the law "directly and not remotely" to restrict or limit communications (whilst noting that the more stringent test favoured by Callinan and Heydon JJ would lead to a different answer). However, Bathurst CJ found that the rule was appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end in a manner compatible with the maintenance of a constitutionally prescribed system of government, by protecting persons from false and defamatory statements from unnamed sources, having regard to the defence of qualified privilege available to those defendants. This is another example of the phenomenon that almost all of the work done in Lange cases occurs in connection with the second limb of the test.
Marshall
In Marshall v Megna [2013] NSWCA 30 (special leave refused, 11 October 2013) the New South Wales Court of Appeal (Beazley JA, Allsop P and Hoeben JA agreeing) rejected a submission that there was an independent category of case within the Lange implied freedom of political communications which did not fall within the traditional category of qualified privilege and which was unconfined by the requirement of reasonableness. That rejection was decisive, because the defamatory conduct complained of, the publication of a circular of a non-existent organisation, the "Drummoyne Council Ratepayers' Association" was never contended to be reasonable.
Van Lieshout
Liu and Marshall were determined six and two days respectively before Monis was delivered.
In Van Lieshout v City of Fremantle (No 2)
[2013] WASC 176 a Lange challenge was made to clauses in a planning scheme regulating the placing of advertising signs supporting the "West Australian Party" (of which Hall J said at [3] "if this is a political party it is not a wellknown one"). Making the assumption that the signs had a political purpose, Hall J found, irrespective of whether the test was that applied by French CJ and Hayne J in Monis, or that by Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ, the laws were reasonably appropriate and adapted to achieve a legitimate end, or alternatively, were clearly proportionate to the objective that they seek to achieve, and there were no less drastic means that were clearly more obvious and compelling as a means of achieving those purposes.
The need to apply the somewhat divergent strands emerging from Monis is likely to be a theme of future litigation invoking the implied freedom; as this decision illustrates, unless it is necessary to do so, it is appropriate for courts below the High Court to avoid making decisions which turn on one strand rather than the other.
III. Just terms
This is an area where the principles are well settled, and yet litigation continues, although as will be seen, the points taken have been weak. Although McHugh J once described s 109 as the "running down constitutional jurisdiction", s 51(xxxi) is arguably a stronger candidate for that unenviable title. The plaintiff most commonly fails because the Australian guarantee is much narrower than "takings" which are forbidden by the 5 th Amendment.
Alcock
In There seems to have been no attention paid to the question whether some more stringent principle obtained. 20 As noted above, this appeal has been heard and is therefore likely soon to be decided.
Today FM
The telephone call by two radio presenters posing as Queen Elizabeth II and Prince Charles gave rise to a constitutional challenge to the investigative and regulatory powers of the Australian Communications and Media Authority in Today FM (Sydney) Pty Ltd v Australian Communications and Media Authority [2013] FCA 1157. The Authority produced a preliminary report in which it expressed the view that the broadcaster had contravened s 11 of the Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW), which would amount to a contravention of a licence condition (which in turn would give rise to other disciplinary powers). The broadcaster sought declaratory relief that the Authority was not authorised to make findings that it had committed a criminal offence, or, if it was, that the authorising provisions were invalid as being contrary to Ch III or should be restrained as interfering, or carrying a real risk of interfering, with the administration of justice in a criminal proceeding.
Edmonds J rejected the challenge on conventional grounds. His Honour emphasised that neither the preliminary finding, nor the final finding of the Authority would itself amount to a determination of guilt or innocence notwithstanding that they might be a stepping stone to some further action. It followed not only that the investigation was authorised, but was not an exercise of judicial power and so not contrary to Ch III.
An appeal is set down for hearing on 5 March 2014 before Allsop CJ, Robertson and Griffiths JJ. [123] of "repugnancy to or incompatibility with that institutional integrity of the State courts which bespeaks their constitutionally mandated position in the Australian legal system". The validity of that very Act had been affirmed in Fardon, and so attention focussed upon the amendments made in some haste 22 by the Criminal Law (Public Interest Declarations) Amendment Act 2013 (Qld), which empowered the Governor, on the recommendation of the Minister, by gazettal to declare that a "relevant person" must be detained if satisfied that his or her detention is in the public interest. The Minister was likewise empowered to recommend if satisfied that detention was in the public interest. A "relevant person" was a person subject to a continuing detention order under the Act. A widely drafted privative clause protected decisions of both the Minister to recommend and the Governor to make a public interest declaration.
Lawrence

Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Lawrence
Applications for continuing detention were made by the Attorney-General, and a case was stated to the Court of Appeal. The joint judgment of the Court of Appeal (Holmes, Muir and Fraser JJA) held that the exercise of the power would undermine the authority of the orders of the Supreme Court. For "the substantial effect of such a declaration is equivalent to a reversal of the Court's order". More importantly, even in the absence of a declaration, the Act undermined the authority of the Supreme Court because of its potential for exercise: "all such orders [viz continuing detention orders] now must be regarded as provisional." Accordingly, it struck down the critical provisions in the 2013 amending Act, noting that doing so did not invalidate the original Act. There are also useful statements as to standing and discretion (at [38]-[41]): Mr Lawrence had an interest in the court order presently being sought by the Attorney against him to be final, rather than subject to the exercise of power under the 2013 Act). If the stage has not been completed by the time specified, Madam Speaker shall put all remaining questions necessary to pass the bill, including clauses en bloc, without further amendment or debate." The motion was carried, and in accordance with it, debate ceased and the bill passed through the chamber shortly after 2am. However, the Court of Appeal treated the application as one for judicial review pursuant to s 69 of the Supreme Court Act. That raised a constitutional question, whether the principles discussed in Kirk required the Court's supervisory jurisdiction to extend to the review of an administrative decision of a single judge of the Court, noting that from time to time it has been said that prerogative writs "went only to an inferior court" (see for example Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 174). Basten JA concluded that the unavailability of review for non-jurisdictional legal error was inapplicable when a judge was not acting in his or her judicial capacity. The Court did not finally determine the metes and bounds of the jurisdiction, it being plain on examination that there were no errors of law in the judge's determination.
NAR
V. Interaction between State and Federal laws State judges
A special leave application was filed on 11 November 2013.
Although self-evidently important, that analysis is relatively straightforward. It may be contrasted with the complexity introduced when a State judge is involved in an inquiry under State law into a conviction in a State court against a law of the Commonwealth.
Lodhi and Petroulias
When a State Act requires a State judge to authorise the Sheriff to investigate into the conviction by a s 80 jury of an offence against a law of the Commonwealth, there is apt to be a multitude of questions which, on the view I take, are fairly described as "constitutional". (In the case of Mr Lodhi, there was hearsay evidence that one juror had been diagnosed with schizophrenia and suffered from paranoid delusions, including "delusions of persecution by terrorists". In the case of Mr Petroulias, an internet blog extending over some 30 pages contained material purporting to reflect a discussion of the merits of the convictions, some purporting to be views of members of the jury.) Section 73A of the Jury Act 1977 (NSW) authorises the sheriff to conduct an investigation if there is reason to suspect that a jury's verdict may have been affected because of improper conduct, but only "with the consent of or at the request of the Supreme Court or District Court". In each case, the Chief Judge at Common Law was asked to request an investigation by the sheriff, and declined to do so. In each case, the applicant commenced proceedings seeking to review that refusal, and the matter was heard by the Court of Appeal constituted by Bathurst CJ, Beazley P and Basten JA. The constitutional issues have nothing to do with s 80; they are much more interesting.
The decisions of the Court of Appeal in Lodhi v Attorney-General of New South Wales
Only by first analysing (a) whether the Chief Judge was exercising an administrative or a judicial power and (b) whether the Court of Appeal reviewing that exercise of power was exercising federal jurisdiction, could one even begin to address the ultimate questions, namely, did the rules of evidence apply, was there an obligation to give reasons, what bases were available (if any) to review the refusal, and could the application for review be treated as a further request to the Court under the Jury Act.
In Lodhi, the Court concluded that the Chief Judge was exercising an administrative power, However, the same analysis meant that the application for judicial review might itself be treated as an application under the Act for the Court to request the sheriff to conduct an investigation. That request, in the case of Mr Lodhi, was ultimately granted. In reaching that conclusion, Basten JA (with whom the other members of the Court agreed) had regard to the operation of s 68 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and concluded that because what was in issue was at one remove from a direct challenge to the conviction for a federal offence, it did not involve an exercise of judicial power, and therefore did not require the operation of s 68 of the Judiciary Act. Instead, State law applied of its own force with respect to the powers of the sheriff and the executive power conferred on the Supreme Court: at [63].
Although Mr Lodhi had exhausted all appeals, Mr Petroulias still had (and still has) undetermined appeal proceedings in the Court of Criminal Appeal. In his case, there was a further question as to whether, indeed, the Court should have been constituted as the Court of Criminal Appeal. No question was raised as to any Momcilovic incompatibility, and the Court was able to turn to the request on its merits and conclude that the proposed investigation was without merit. Although the threshold jurisdictional and constitutional questions were novel and complex and more difficult that the ultimate question on the merits, the Court (in my respectful view, entirely properly) first identified the existence and nature of its jurisdiction.
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Amelia
In Amelia v Dallas [2013] SASC 160, Gray J addressed unusual arguments arising out of a custody and property dispute between a deceased man's widow and mother. A statement of claim was filed in the High Court alleging that Ms Amelia was a resident of South Australia and Ms Dallas was a resident of New South Wales. The High Court, seemingly on its own motion, remitted the proceeding to the Supreme Court of South Australia. The respondent contended that the High Court's order was made without jurisdiction, with the consequence that the Supreme Court of South Australia lacked jurisdiction. That was the occasion for Gray J reasoning, with respect surely correctly, that
• it being the "first duty" of any court to satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction, the High Court's order impliedly determined that the parties were residents of different Australian states and therefore within the High Court's diversity jurisdiction under s 75(iv);
• the High Court being a superior court of record, its order was valid until set aside and could not be the subject of collateral challenge, and
• the Supreme Court's jurisdiction was sourced in s 44 of the Judiciary Act, which was enlivened by the remittal order. , which imposes a higher rent on land leased from the state to a carrier pursuant to a "communications lease" than would be the case if it were a "business or government lease". However, the decision is not about the ultimate question of inconsistency.
V.2 Section 109 inconsistency
Telstra
Faced with slowly moving proceedings, and Telstra's attitude that it was not required to pay rent at the prescribed rates, leading to what the State claimed to be a debt of $12.5 million and steadily increasing, the State sought the following declaration: That is an unusual application (many landlords would crystallise a dispute by exercising powers under the lease for default, or seeking an interlocutory injunction, or levying execution for debt or identifying a separate question for early decision). There was, to my mind a little surprisingly, extensive debate about whether the declaration in the form sought was interlocutory or final, and whether there was an "irrebuttable presumption" that delegated legislation is valid unless and until declared invalid. Rangiah J had little difficulty holding that there was no such presumption, that the declaration sought by the State was interlocutory, and accordingly, on conventional grounds, could not be granted.
BCBC
In BCBC Singapore Pte Ltd v PT Bayan Resources Tbk
[2013] WASC 239, Le Miere J rejected a challenge to the making of freezing orders in aid of proceedings on a cause of action being tried in a foreign court. He rejected the submission that the Court's rules regulating freezing were s 109 inconsistent with the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth); it was sufficient to observe that the federal Act was not an exclusive and exhaustive code with respect to the enforcement of foreign judgments, but in any event, as his Honour held, the making of a freezing order does not impair, negate or detract from the operation of the federal Act. Rather, it supports the ability of the Court to prevent the Court's processes from being frustrated.
Nor was there any incompatibility, contrary to Ch III of the Constitution, in the conferral of the function of making freezing orders upon the State court. The submission was that "it is antithetical to the judicial process to make predictions about how matters may turn out in foreign proceedings without the Australian court actually being empowered, or called upon, to make the decision for itself applying foreign law": at [69] . The short answer to the submission was that the Supreme Court has an inherent jurisdiction to make a freezing order, which therefore cannot be contrary to Ch III. That is a useful proposition to bear in mind; it accords with long-standing statements, especially by McHugh J, as to the importance of historical antecedents to laws and practices said to engage Kable. In the absence of such conflict and in the presence of a relevant connection to sustain extraterritorial legislative competency, extra-territorial effect will be given to a State law purporting to have that effect.
In effect that applies, with respect sensibly, substantially similar principles of "operational inconsistency" to resolve a conflict between two State laws or, more accurately, a potential conflict between orders pursuant to two State laws. Seen in that light, there is no conflict at all. This emphasises that irrespective of the merits of the predominate territorial nexus test, a precondition to applying it is that there is an actual, rather than merely potential, conflict between State laws. ), namely, may judicial power be given to the Board? His Honour found that even had the powers of the Board to cancel periodic detention been the exercise of judicial power, then the ACT legislative assembly had power to invest the Board with that jurisdiction. That amounted to what may be regarded as a surprising conclusion:
Oz Minerals
Having given the matter anxious and careful thought and not without some hesitation, I am of the view that the current state of authority is that there is no applicable doctrine of the separation of powers flowing from the Australian Constitution that applies in the ACT as an independent self-governing territory, and that, while the ACT courts may be invested with federal jurisdiction, as are the State courts, the judicial power of the ACT is not the judicial power of the Commonwealth.
If by that paragraph his Honour was saying that the Territory courts invariably exercise the judicial power of the ACT and not the judicial power of the Commonwealth, then that proposition is incorrect. 27 Indeed, his Honour was exercising the judicial power of the Commonwealth, hearing and determining a panoply of constitutional submissions which amounted to a s 76(i) matter.
However, in my opinion the better view is that Territory courts invariably exercise the judicial power of the Commonwealth. The only authority squarely on point is O'Neill v Mann, where Finn J held unequivocally that because the source of all enforceable laws in the Territory (including the common law action in defamation before him) arose indirectly under the Seat of Government Acceptance Act 1909 and ss 3 and 4 of the Seat of Government (Administration) Act 1910, there was a s 76(ii) matter. That reasoning was, and was expressed to be, essential to Finn J's conclusion that (sitting in the Federal Court) he was validly exercising cross-vested jurisdiction. His Honour did not refer to (and may not have been taken to) Finn J's reasons. That suggests that the decision may be regarded as having been decided per incuriam.
The general question is of considerable importance to all three self-governing Territories. There were other, narrower ways, argued by the parties, by which the same result could have been reached. In short, there are in my respectful opinion a number of criticisms which may be made of Lewis, which stands alone as an atypical example of a non-incremental constitutional law decision made in 2013 by courts below the High Court.
Conclusion
Whether or not one agrees or disagrees that all of these decisions properly answer the description of "constitutional" is not to the point. If a review of them has caused people to think again about the nature of constitutional litigation, in the Australian legal system -a legal system which is one of the most mature in the common law world -then a principal purpose of this paper will have been achieved. The decisions also illustrate the important incremental role of courts below the High Court working out the metes and bounds of constitutional principle; which is simply the ancient tradition of the common law in action. 
